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The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st
Century
Paul A. Jargowsky†
Introduction
Residential segregation has long been regarded as one of the
key pillars sustaining racial inequality. The Kerner Commission,
formed to investigate the causes of the race riots of the 1960s, found
that “[s]egregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a
destructive environment totally unknown to most [W]hite
Americans.”1 Moreover, progress against racial inequality could not
be achieved, they concluded, as long as we continue to move towards
“two societies, one [B]lack, one [W]hite—separate and unequal.”2
Such concerns were the impetus for a variety of strategies and
legislative acts to break down the separation of the races, including
school desegregation and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Fifty years
down the road from those tumultuous times, it is fair to ask whether
we have made progress against racial segregation.3
Two prominent economists, Edward Glaeser of Harvard
University and Jacob Vigdor of Duke University, conducted a
widely-cited study of segregation over the last one-hundred and
twenty years in the United States.4 Their report, provocatively
titled The End of the Segregated Century, documented the rapid rise

†. This paper is an extension of remarks delivered at the Summit for Civil
Rights at the University of Minnesota Law School, November 9–10, 2017. Some of
the research results reported herein were funded through a grant from the National
Science Foundation, Award 1636520. I received helpful comments and suggestions
from Natasha Fletcher, Christopher Wheeler, and participants at the Summit.
Comments
and
suggestions
welcome;
please
direct
them
to
paul.jargowsky@rutgers.edu.
1. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter THE KERNER
REPORT].
2. Id.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73,
81–90 (1968).
4. EDWARD GLAESER & JACOB VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY:
RACIAL SEPARATION IN AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS, 1890–2010, at 1–26 (2012)
[hereinafter GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY]; see also
David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the
American Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 455–506 (1999) (examining segregation in
United States cities from 1890 to 1990).
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in segregation from 1890 through 1970, as well as the “no less
dramatic” decline since 1970.5 Among other findings, they report
that as of 2010, United States metropolitan areas were more
integrated than at any time since 1910; that completely White
neighborhoods were effectively extinct; and that Black ghettos were
in rapid decline.6 Yet, they noted, “there has been only limited
progress in closing achievement and employment gaps between
[B]lacks and [W]hites.”7 They conclude that the belief and hope that
reducing segregation would facilitate progress towards racial
equality was misguided: “[f]orty years later,” they argue, “we know
that this dream was a myth.”8
In this article, I argue that their optimism about racial
segregation’s decline and their pessimism about the potential
benefits of reducing racial segregation are incorrect on several
counts. First, while there has been some progress in reducing
segregation by race in United States metropolitan areas, certain
methodological aspects of Glaeser and Vigdor’s analysis led them to
significantly overstate the extent of the decline. Second, Glaeser
and Vigdor failed to account for changes in economic segregation,
which interacts with and reinforces the impact of racial segregation;
in particular, economic segregation has been increasing in ways
that negate some of the progress in racial segregation per se. Third,
they did not address the implications of sub-metropolitan geospatial
patterns, which effectively limit the access of Blacks and Hispanics
to important public amenities—notably, high-quality public
education.
Fourth, they did not address life-cycle issues,
specifically that children enrolled in school are more segregated
than adults.
Given that public education is organized
geographically, the higher segregation of children renders the
decline in segregation less meaningful in terms of access to
opportunity than it appears from the overall numbers. Thus, the
facts on the ground are bleaker than suggested in Glaeser and
Vidgor’s analysis, and, as a result, they were incorrect to dismiss
the potential benefit of racial integration to reduce social and
economic disparities.
Part I explores the trends in racial segregation and shows how
Glaeser and Vigdor’s conclusions depend in part on a measurement
scheme that I argue is questionable. I also revisit the trends using

at 4.

5. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4,
6. Id. at 1–26.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id.
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the approach that is more common in sociological analyses.
Following that, in Part II I examine the distinct but related
phenomenon of economic segregation.
Contrary to racial
segregation, economic segregation has been increasing. Given how
these forms of segregation intersect and interact, the rise of
economic segregation has implications for understanding the
significance of racial segregation in the current context. Part III
addresses the changing geographic basis of racial segregation,
showing that it increasingly is structured by municipal boundaries,
which has great significance given the importance of those
boundaries in limiting access to economic opportunities and public
amenities. The penultimate section, Part IV, addresses how lifecycle differences in segregation have led to greater segregation
among children, which is a concern because children are the age
group most susceptible to segregation’s negative effects. Finally,
the concluding section addresses what we learn from this analysis
about the persistence of racial segregation in the twenty-first
century.
I.

Racial Segregation

Segregation is defined as the separation of distinct groups into
separate conditions. One can speak of occupational segregation by
gender, educational segregation of pupils of different races into
different schools or classrooms, or the economic segregation of social
classes to different types of communities. In the United States, the
term most often refers to racial residential segregation—that is, the
segregation of persons of different races and ethnicities into
different neighborhoods.
A. Measuring Racial Segregation
If segregation is separation, then its opposite is an even
distribution of groups across the outcome of interest. There are
many ways to measure segregation, but by far the most common is
the Index of Dissimilarity,9 which equals 0 when the distribution of
two groups is perfectly even and 100 if the two groups are
completely separated.10 While the Index of Dissimilarity has been
criticized on various methodological grounds,11 in practice it is
9. Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of
Segregation Indexes, 20 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 211 (1955) (describing the Index of
Dissimilarity as the “Nonwhite Section Index”).
10. Christopher Winship, A Revaluation of Indexes of Residential Segregation, 55
SOC. FORCES 1058, 1059 (1977).
11. Id. at 1058, 1061–62, 1065.
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highly correlated with other measures that focus on the evenness of
the distribution of groups across neighborhoods.12 The value of the
Index may be interpreted as the proportion of one group that would
have to move to achieve complete integration.13 In general,
segregation levels of thirty or below are considered low, above thirty
and up to seventy are considered moderate, and values above
seventy are considered high.14
To calculate the Index of Dissimilarity, one needs to define two
distinct groups and look at their distribution across smaller units
(neighborhoods) within a larger unit (usually a housing market).
For neighborhoods, I follow the common practice, as do Glaeser and
Vigdor, of using Census tracts; these are small geographic units
defined by the United States Census Bureau for data collection
purposes that average about 4,000 residents.15
I use
contemporaneous census tracts rather than tracts with boundaries
normalized to a given year. Tracts as drawn in any given Census
year are the best representation of neighborhoods in those years.
This keeps the average population size of the neighborhood units
more consistent over time, and it is well known that segregation
measures are sensitive to the size of neighborhood units employed.16
For housing markets, I use metropolitan areas, which are cities of
50,000 or more residents, the county in which the central city is
located, and surrounding counties that are closely tied to the central
county by commuting patterns and other factors.17 For 1990 and
2000, I draw from the long form data from the United States Census
for those years. For 2010, because a comparable long form survey
was not conducted, I use the American Community Survey file that
spans 2008–2012, a period centered on 2010.

12. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions of Racial
Segregation, 67 SOC. FORCES 281, 284–87 (1988).
13. Winship, supra note 10, at 1061.
14. NATHAN KANTROWITZ, ETHNIC AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE NEW YORK
METROPOLIS 15 (1973).
15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL 1–3
(1994).
16. S. Openshaw, Ecological Fallacies and the Analysis of Areal Census Data, 16
ENV’T & PLAN. A 17, 18 (1984) (“Indeed, it is now known that the modifiable nature
of areal units can be systematically exploited by heuristic procedures to produce a
very wide range of different results, irrespective of what individual-level analysis
would have produced . . . .”); Sean F. Reardon & David O’Sullivan, Measures of
Spatial Segregation, 34 SOC. METHODOLOGY 121, 123 (2004) (“Aspatial segregation
measures have been repeatedly criticized in the residential segregation context for
their failure to account for the spatial patterning of census tracts . . . .”).
17. 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical
Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,245, 37,252 (June 28, 2010).
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B. Segregation of Who from Whom?
An important issue is how to define the two groups whose
segregation is to be measured. Glaeser and Vigdor consider the
segregation of Blacks from all other persons, i.e. Blacks from nonBlacks. This is a crucial and, I would argue, incorrect decision. The
whole point of segregation studies is that a segregated group is
excluded from contact with a powerful advantaged group and
geographically isolated from the resources, housing, and public
amenities that the advantaged group enjoys.
Therefore, a
conceptually valid measurement scheme should measure
segregation of minority and disadvantaged groups from the
majority group. If Blacks more frequently reside with low-income
Hispanic immigrants, that does not mean they have achieved better
access to high-performing schools, safer streets, and quality
housing. The more logical approach to segregation analysis is to
calculate the segregation of minority groups from the advantaged
majority group, in other words, from non-Hispanic Whites.18 The
choice between Black/non-Black and Black/White makes a large
difference in the analysis, both in terms of the measured levels of
segregation and the trends over time, as we see in the following
section.19
C. Segregation by Race Is Declining, but How Fast?
Glaeser and Vigdor, consistent with past studies,20 show that
Black versus non-Black segregation increased dramatically in the
early decades of the twentieth century during the Great Migration
of southern Blacks to northern industrial cities.21 By their measure,
18. Another measurement issue is that residents of group quarters should be
excluded from the analysis. Residents of jails and nursing homes do not interact in
the same way with other residents of a neighborhood. When a minority group
member is arrested in New York City and sent “upstate,” this does not advance the
cause of integration. I have excluded them in my calculations, but I am not sure how
Glaeser and Vigdor handled the issue. Fortunately, the number of group quarters
residents is small in most tracts and the effect on the numbers is negligible.
19. It should also be noted that race is self-identified and that starting in the
2000 Census, individuals could select more than one race. Reynolds Farley, Racial
Identities in 2000: The Response to the Multiple-Race Response Option, in THE NEW
RACE QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS 33, 33 (Joel
Perlmann & Mary C. Waters eds., 2002). However, very few individuals chose to do
so, and all analyses here are based on people who identified as White alone or Black
alone, excluding those who identified as Hispanic. Id. at 45.
20. Douglas S. Massey & Zoltan L. Hajnal, The Changing Geographic Structure
of Black-White Segregation in the United States, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 527 (1995); DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
21. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4,
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the Index of Dissimilarity peaked at about eighty percent in 1970.22
Since then, they find a dramatic decline to about fifty-five percent
in 2010, the lowest level since 1910 and the basis of their declaring
“the end of the segregated century.”23
However, a good part of the decline they report is driven by
their choice of racial groups. As Hispanic and Asian immigrants
arrived, they typically settled in urban population centers in areas
of low-cost housing—in other words, in and around Black
neighborhoods.24 Using a Black/non-Black metric, the mingling of
Blacks with other minority groups shows up as integration.25
Figure 1 below compares the Black/non-Black approach to the
Index of Dissimilarity between Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites
between 1990 and 2010.26 During that period, the proportion of the
population of the 384 metropolitan areas that was neither White
nor Black nearly tripled, rising from 10% in 1990 to 28% in 2010.
The 7.6-point drop in dissimilarity shown by Glaeser and Vigdor,
from 65 to 57.4 (-12%) is not reflected in the figures that use Blacks
and non-Hispanic Whites as the groups. While the level in 1990
was comparable to the Black/non-Black figure, the decline was
much smaller, only 4.3 points on a base of 67.3 (-6%). By their choice
of groups on which to compute the Index, Glaeser and Vigdor
exaggerated the extent of the decline relative to 1990.

at 3.
22. Id. at 4, fig. 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 9–10.
25. Id. at 2–9.
26. The segregation values in this bar chart, as well as all calculations reported
in the figures and text below that are not attributed to another source, were
calculated by the author from the Census data described above.
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Figure 1. Index of Dissimilarity, 1990–2010, Average of 384
Metroplitan Areas

The importance of this choice can also be seen by looking at the
values for specific cities.
Table 1 shows the Index of Dissimilarity computed both
ways for the twenty largest metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2010.27
The Index of Dissimilarity computed between Blacks and nonHispanic Whites is always larger than when it is computed between
Blacks and non-Blacks; in fact, it cannot be less. In 1990, however,
the differences were mostly small, with the exceptions of New York
and Los Angeles. By 2010, the difference between the two measures
was also greater than in 1990, sometimes dramatically so; it more
than doubled in fifteen of the twenty metropolitan areas, reflecting
the increasing tendency of Blacks to share neighborhoods with the
growing numbers of Hispanic and Asian immigrants.

27. The figures for 2010 differ slightly for some metropolitan areas from those
shown in Table 1 of Glaeser and Vigdor due to differences in data sources and
geographic concepts. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY,
supra note 4.
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Table 1. Comparison of Black/Non-Black and Black/White
Indices of Dissimilarity, Twenty Largest Metropolitan
Areas, 1990 and 2010

As a result, the apparent decline in racial segregation was
larger using the Glaeser-Vigdor measure for all twenty
metropolitan areas. In Houston, for example, the decline of twelve
points in dissimilarity of Blacks versus non-Blacks was only three
points when comparing Blacks and Whites. In Denver, the apparent
improvement of five points is almost completely eliminated using
the Black/White approach. Riverside-San Bernardino showed a
small decline by the Black/non-Black measure but actually had an
increase in segregation using the Black/White measure. Santa AnaAnaheim-Irvine bucked the trend by showing an increase in both
measures, but the increase was larger when contrasting Blacks and
Whites. In these large metropolitan areas, on average there was
progress by both measures, but using the Black/non-Black Index of
Dissimilarity greatly exaggerated the progress toward racial
integration. While it is true that over this period Blacks were less
likely to live alone in neighborhoods, to a large extent this reflected
an influx of immigrants rather than achieving access to nonHispanic White neighborhoods and the resources and public
amenities they possess. To better capture this reality, for the
remainder of the Article, racial segregation is measured by applying
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the Index of Dissimilarity to Blacks as compared to non-Hispanic
Whites.
D. Segregation Is Highest Where Blacks Actually Live
Segregation of Blacks from non-Hispanic Whites is
substantially worse in metropolitan areas with larger Black
populations. Figure 2 shows the segregation levels of the 384
metropolitan areas graphed against the log of the number of Black
residents. The bivariate regression line, as shown in the figure,
indicates that the Index of Dissimilarity increases by 0.5 points for
every 10% increase in Black population (t=14.27, p<0.001).
Metropolitan areas with lower segregation levels tend to have fewer
than 100,000 Black residents, but those areas with more than
500,000 Black residents virtually all have high segregation levels.
As a result, more than half of all metropolitan Blacks lived in areas
where the 2010 Index of Dissimilarity was 60 or higher; one-fourth
lived in areas where it was 70 or higher; and more than one in ten
lived in one of the four metropolitan areas where the Index of
Dissimilarity was 80 or more—New York (80.2), Detroit (81.2),
Newark-Union (80.0), or Milwaukee (81.6).
Figure 2. Segregation Between Blacks and Non-Hispanic
Whites by Black Population Size (Log), 2010

80

60
Index of
Dissimilarity
40

20
10,000

100,000
Black Population (log)

1,000,000
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These figures show that segregation, far from having ended, is
still a prominent feature of the United States metropolitan
landscape. That is not to say there has been no progress. For
example, as Glaeser and Vigdor point out, the number of census
tracts with exactly zero Black residents declined from 4,700 in 1960
to only 424 in 2010.28 However, a single Black resident in a
neighborhood of thousands may not be that meaningful, so it is
more insightful to look at broader categories of racial percentages,
as shown in Table 2. The change from 1990 to 2010 in the
proportion of the Black population of metropolitan areas29 living in
predominantly White neighborhoods—census tracts that were less
than 10% Black—rose only a slight amount, from 13% to 14.3%, a
much more modest change than implied by the “zero Black
residents” figure. The proportion of Blacks living in virtually allBlack tracts—90% Black or more—declined substantially from 28%
to 14%.30 Where did the other 14% go? The fastest growth was in
neighborhoods in the range of 10% to 40% Black. Nearly 85% of the
White population lived in neighborhoods where fewer than 10% of
the residents were Black in 1990; while that declined, more than
three-fourths of Whites still lived in such neighborhoods by 2010.
These are positive changes, but not particularly large or dramatic
ones.

28. GLAESER & VIGDOR, THE END OF THE SEGREGATED CENTURY, supra note 4,
at 7. Note that even this decline is an underestimate, because the number of census
tracts increased from 22,688 to 72,531 as tracts were split to accommodate
population growth and more areas of the country were divided into census tracts. Id.
29. Note that about 90% of Blacks and 80% of Whites live in one of the 384 areas
covered in the analysis as of 2010.
30. Note that this change could happen either by Blacks leaving tracts with 90%
or more Black residents or by an influx of non-Black residents, leading the tract to
be re-categorized as below 90%.
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Table 2. Distribution of Metropolitan Area Residents by
Percent Black, 1990–2010

Another indication of progress is the decline in cities with
extreme levels of segregation. While 52% of Blacks still lived in
metropolitan areas with segregation levels of 60 or more in 2010, as
noted earlier, this is down from 75% in 1990. And while 11% of
metropolitan Blacks lived in metropolitan areas with Dissimilarity
of 80 or more in 2010, that figure was down from 26% in 1990. But
at the pace of the decline in Black/non-Hispanic White segregation
experienced over 1990 to 2010, it will be decades before it is reduced
to levels comparable with other racial and ethnic minority groups
today or the historical levels experienced by European immigrants
at the peak of their segregation.
II. Economic Segregation31
Race is the preeminent dimension of residential segregation in
the United States, but it is not the only one. Poor, middle-class, and
affluent households tend to live in very different neighborhoods,
separated by walls, highways, railroad tracks, and municipal
boundaries. Metropolitan neighborhoods vary enormously in terms
of residents’ incomes, housing size and conditions, and public
amenities—from sheet-rock mansions surrounded by green lawns
in wealthy suburban enclaves to run-down row homes and housing
projects in depopulated central-city ghettos and barrios. This
phenomenon is known as economic segregation, and it serves to
reinforce racial segregation and exacerbate its effects.32 Given that
31. This section draws heavily on Paul A. Jargowsky & Christopher Wheeler,
Economic Segregation in US Metropolitan Areas, 1970–2010, (21st Century Cities
Initiative,
John
Hopkins
Univ.,
Nov.
2017),
http://www.21stcentury
neighborhoods.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/jargowsky.pdf.
32. Douglas S. Massey, Jonathan Rothwell & Thurston Domina, The Changing
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minority groups are poorer on average than non-Hispanic Whites,
economic and racial segregation interact with each other to create
neighborhoods which are doubly isolated from the mainstream of
American society.
Economic segregation, resulting in vastly unequal
neighborhoods, is linked to many social and economic problems.
Residents of high-poverty neighborhoods are systematically cut off
from public resources in education, housing, and health care and
simultaneously exposed to higher levels of crime, violence, and
economic isolation.33 High-poverty neighborhoods have significant
long-term consequences for their residents, particularly young
children who grow up in such places.34 While residents of highpoverty areas are harmed most directly, the costs of economic
segregation are shared more broadly.35 Crime and violence incur
substantial costs in terms of enhanced security, policing, court
systems, and incarceration.36 Poor health outcomes among the
uninsured and those with publicly-funded insurance drive up
health care expenses.37 The costs, financial and otherwise, of these
outcomes are passed on to more privileged residents of metropolitan
areas wherever they might reside.38

Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 ANN . AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 74, 77,
87–88 (2009).
33. ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 46–49 (2012); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 28–30
(2013).
34. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure
to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity
Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 858 (2016) [hereinafter Chetty, Hendren &
Katz, Effects of Exposure]; Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The
Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553,
1611 (2014) [hereinafter Chetty et al., Land of Opportunity]; Patrick Sharkey, The
Intergenerational Transmission of Context, 113 AM. J. SOC. 931, 933 (2008).
35. GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE COST OF SEGREGATION: NATIONAL TRENDS AND THE
CASE OF CHICAGO, 1990–2010, at 18–27 (2017); PETER DREIER, JOHN MOLLENKOPF
& TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 88–93 (3d ed. 2014).
36. ACS, supra note 35, at 6 (“In particular, [B]lacks living in hypersegregated
areas are exposed to elevated levels of crime and violence, pervasive joblessness,
lower levels of educational attainment, low collective efficacy, and chronic physical
and psychological health conditions.”); DREIER, MOLLENKOPF & SWANSTROM, supra
note 35, at 88–89.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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A. Measurement Issues
Segregation on the basis of household income presents a
challenge in terms of measurement because income is a continuous
variable rather than a categorical one like race. The poverty line
does define two groups, poor and non-poor, whose segregation from
each other can be measured using the Index of Dissimilarity.
However, much of the variation in income is discarded by this
approach, since a family of four with income slightly above the
poverty line, say $26,000, is lumped together with multimillionaires. Measurement of economic segregation requires a
more sophisticated approach.
In previous work, Jeongdai Kim and I developed a class of
measures of segregation based on ideas from information theory
that are particularly useful for measuring segregation on a
continuous variable.39 We argued that economic segregation may
be measured by computing the ratio of neighborhood inequality to
household inequality. The basic idea is that there is a certain
amount of income inequality between households.
These
households are then grouped into neighborhoods. If there were
perfect economic integration, all neighborhoods would be more or
less equal; neighborhood inequality—the numerator in the ratio—
would be zero, and therefore, economic segregation would be zero as
well. In contrast, if there were perfect economic segregation, there
would be no mixing of households of different income levels within
neighborhoods.
The neighborhood and household inequality
measures would then be the same, and thus, the segregation
measure formed by their ratio would be 1.0. While almost any
measure of inequality can be used to form this ratio, the results
presented below employ the well-known Gini Coefficient,40 which
measures how unequally income is distributed across the household
or neighborhood units.41

39. Paul A. Jargowsky & Jeongdai Kim, The Information Theory of Segregation:
Uniting Segregation and Inequality in a Common Framework (Nat’l Poverty Ctr.,
Working Paper 09-05, 2009); Paul A. Jargowsky & Jeongdai Kim, The GINI
Coefficient and Segregation on a Continuous Variable (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working
Paper 05-2, 2005).
40. Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 31 ECON. J. 124, 124–
26 (1921); THOMAS PIKETTY, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY 10 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2015).
41. Other inequality measures, such as the Theil Index, could equally well be
used. An example is the Neighborhood Sorting Index, which is the ratio of the
standard deviation of household income to the standard deviation of neighborhood
income. Paul A. Jargowsky, Take the Money and Run: Economic Segregation in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 984, 988 (1996).

220

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 36: 207

The next section describes the trends in household inequality,
neighborhood inequality, and economic segregation. In addition to
the data described above, this analysis includes information on
household income from the U.S. Censuses conducted in 1970 and
1980.42 Prior to the 1990 Census, census tracts had not been defined
for the whole country. For that reason, it is not possible to calculate
segregation measures going back to 1970 for all 384 metropolitan
areas. These results use a set of 264 metropolitan areas that had
sufficient data to track them over the whole period.
B. Trends in Household and Neighborhood Inequality
Income inequality increased dramatically in almost all United
States metropolitan areas between 1970 and 2010. Table 3 below
shows the average statistics on household income distributions for
264 metropolitan areas. The average metropolitan area’s mean
income was little changed in the 1970s, but increased rapidly from
1980 to 2000, followed by a decline between 2000 and 2010,
reflecting the financial crisis and the deep recession that followed.
Despite that decline, real mean income rose 17% between 1970 and
2010. Incomes were also more variable; over the period, the
standard deviation of household income increased by nearly 22%.
The gains in household income were not widely shared, however.
The first four quintiles of households—four-fifths of the
population—actually experienced a decline in their share of total
metropolitan income. The second quintile—a good approximation
of the working class—declined the fastest, dropping more than 18%.
Meanwhile, the top fifth quintile saw its share of total income rise
from 44.8% to 49.9%. The rising tide lifted only the largest boats,
as the most affluent households claimed very nearly half of all
metropolitan income.

42. See CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1970,
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2018);
CENSUS
BUREAU,
CENSUS
OF
POPULATION
AND
HOUSING,
1980,
https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2018).
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Table 3. Distribution of Household Income in the Average
Metropolitan Area

Clearly, household income inequality was increasing over this
period. Figure 3 shows the average Gini Index of Income Inequality
for both households and neighborhoods relative to 1970 for the 264
metropolitan areas.
Household inequality increased steadily
starting in 1980, consistent with national and international trends
showing that inequality began rising in the late 1970s.
Neighborhood inequality rose faster than household inequality in
the 1980s and 2000s; in the 1990s, household inequality grew faster.
Over the whole period, however, neighborhood inequality in United
States metropolitan areas clearly outpaced household inequality.
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Figure 3. Gini Coefficients, Household and Neighborhood,
Relative to 1970

Household inequality is a precondition for economic
segregation, just as there can be no racial segregation unless there
are different racial groups. Given a level of income inequality
among households, economic segregation comes down to the
question of how much inequality is between rather than within
neighborhoods. As household income inequality has risen, if the
division of that inequality within and between neighborhoods had
remained the same, neighborhood inequality would have increased
at the same rate as household inequality. As the figure shows,
however, neighborhood inequality grew faster. The implication is
that neighborhoods became more unequal for two different reasons.
First, there was simply a lot more inequality overall. Second,
households were sorted into neighborhoods in ways that led a
greater proportion of household inequality to be between, rather
than within neighborhoods. In other words, economic segregation
increased.43
43. Other approaches to measuring economic segregation reach the same
conclusion. See Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income
Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1093 (2011); Ann Owens, Inequality in Children’s
Contexts: Income Segregation of Households with and Without Children, 81 AM. SOC.
REV. 549, 550–51 (2016); Tara Watson, Inequality and the Measurement of
Residential Segregation by Income in American Neighborhoods, 55 REV. INCOME
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While virtually every metropolitan area saw rising inequality
of household income, not all of them had rising economic
segregation.
Figure 4 shows household and neighborhood
inequality values relative to 1970 for specific metropolitan areas.
New York and Philadelphia both experienced increases in income
inequality. The Gini for neighborhoods, however, grew even faster,
which implies that economic segregation was increasing. Denver
and Minneapolis also experienced increasing household income
inequality, as did almost all United States metropolitan areas. The
neighborhood Gini increased in these areas as well, but only in
proportion to the increase in the household Gini. In places like
Denver and Minneapolis, there was more neighborhood inequality,
but it was mainly due to the increase in household inequality; the
degree of sorting of inequality within and between neighborhoods
remained stable.

WEALTH 820, 843 (2009).
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Figure 4. Household and Neighborhood Inequality in 4
Metropolitan Areas
This is an important difference. Household inequality was

increasing everywhere, but that was mostly due to factors outside
of local policymakers’ control—globalization, returns to skill, the
national economy, etc. In addition, some places made things worse
by having more residential sorting of households by income—New
York, for example, but not Minneapolis. Much of that could be due
to suburban sprawl, zoning, school assignment policies, and the
construction and spatial distribution of different types of housing.
Richard Rothstein has powerfully described the role of law and
policy in creating and sustaining racial segregation.44 Likewise, law
and policy contribute to—indeed, often require—economic
segregation.45
Increasing income inequality and economic segregation
undercut the potential beneficial effects of the decreases in racial

44. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 51–57, 77–91, 190–93 (2017).
45. Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Density Zoning and Class
Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1123 (2010); PAUL A.
JARGOWSKY, ARCHITECTURE OF SEGREGATION: CIVIL UNREST, THE CONCENTRATION
OF POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2015), http://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/
Jargowsky_ArchitectureofSegregation.pdf;
Editorial,
The
Architecture
of
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/
opinion/sunday/the-architecture-of-segregation.html; Michael C. Lens & Paavo
Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More
Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 6, 7–11 (2016).
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segregation discussed in the previous section. Inequality, racial
segregation, and economic segregation interact.46 Because Black
incomes are so much lower on average than White incomes,
segregation by race also means that Black neighborhoods will be far
poorer than White neighborhoods at any given level of economic
segregation.
Because there is so much inequality among
households, economic segregation results in greater inequality
among neighborhoods at any given level of racial segregation.
Because there is so much racial segregation, economic segregation
among Blacks produces much poorer neighborhoods than if Blacks
were interspersed with the much less poor White population. Thus,
it is misguided to declare the “end of the segregated century” due to
a decline in racial segregation when, at the same time, household
income inequality and economic segregation have been increasing.
Surely, the decline in racial segregation since the 1970s is evidence
of progress in both social and legal terms. However, other things
are not equal. The racial segregation that stubbornly persists plays
out in a very different context; its negative effects are exacerbated
by substantially higher levels of income inequality and economic
segregation.
III. Metropolitan Geography
Racial segregation has undergone geographic restructuring.
At the turn of the twentieth century, most Blacks resided in rural
areas and small towns in the South whereas the White population
was predominantly Northern and urban.
After the Great
Migration, however, regional segregation subsided and
neighborhood-level segregation exploded.47 Douglas Massey notes
that, starting in about 1950, Blacks and Whites became more
segregated across municipal boundaries. Massey goes on to state
that, “[a]fter 1950 . . . [B]lacks and [W]hites came to reside in
wholly different towns and cities.”48 This process was driven by
White flight and suburban sprawl, as new suburbs used land-use
policies and exclusionary zoning to effectively protect suburban
Whites from having lower-income and minority neighbors.49 It is
46. Massey, Rothwell & Domina, supra note 32, at 87–88.
47. See Massey & Hajnal, supra note 20, at 534–536.
48. Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Conditions in
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 391, 398 (Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson & Faith Mitchell
eds., 2001). Massey references his early study with Zoltan L. Hajnal on indices of
Black/White segregation. Massey & Hajnal, supra note 20, at 537.
49. See generally Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density
Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 779, 779–82
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perhaps equally important that White parents were able to send
their children to predominantly White schools if they could afford
the entry fees: the down payment, property taxes, and monthly
mortgage on a large suburban home. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
noted, “even though the days of state enforced segregation are gone,
segregation because of geographical boundaries remains.”50
The proliferation of suburban jurisdictions, particularly after
1970, facilitated White flight. While Blacks have suburbanized, in
many cases they have moved to older inner-ring suburbs whose
White populations have moved to newer, more remote suburbs;51
Ferguson, Missouri, is a case in point. Newer suburbs where the
majority of housing units were built after 1970 still tend to be
disproportionately White and affluent.52 To a large extent, racial
segregation is driven by jurisdictional boundaries. In research with
Deborah Rog and Kathryn Henderson, I computed the Index of
Dissimilarity using city and suburban jurisdictions rather than
census tracts as the neighborhood unit. The Index of Dissimilarity
represents how much segregation would remain if there was
complete integration within jurisdiction boundaries. For example,
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, it would be as if every
neighborhood in Philadelphia had the same share of Whites and
Blacks as the city as a whole, and the same for the several hundred
suburbs in the metropolitan area.53 On average, across 384
metropolitan areas, the level of segregation calculated using
municipal jurisdictions is three-fourths of the figures discussed
above using census tracts.54 In other words, if segregation could be
completely eliminated within cities and towns, three-fourths of
(2009); see also Paul A. Jargowsky, Sprawl, Concentration of Poverty, and Urban
Inequality, in URBAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, & POLICY RESPONSES 39,
42–48 (Gregory Squires ed., 2002) (exploring how exclusion from the suburbs led to
racial residential segregation and the concentration of poverty).
50. Irin Carmon, Exclusive Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview: Full
Transcript (last update Feb. 17, 2015, 8:06 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
exclusive-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-full-transcript.
51. See Bernadette Hanlon, The Decline of Older, Inner Suburbs in Metropolitan
America, 19 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 423 (2008); Katrin Anacker, Christopher Niedt &
Chang Kwon, Analyzing Segregation in Mature and Developing Suburbs in the
United States, 39 J. URB. AFF. 819 (2017).
52. See Paul A. Jargowsky, Debra J. Rog & Kathryn Henderson, Suburban
Poverty and Racial Segregation, URB. PUB. 1–8 (2014), https://engaged
scholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2309&context=urban_facpub
(discussing a “boom” in construction of suburbs in the 1970s and exploring how
“[W]hite flight was a primary cause in the development of the new suburbs”). This
report was prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and
was reproduced in Urban Publications.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 9–11, fig. 6.
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segregation would still remain because of the segregation between
metropolitan jurisdictions.
To the extent that reductions in racial segregation have played
out in large central cities, the benefits of these reductions may be
limited if they occurred within fiscally-strapped central cities or
within aging, deteriorating suburbs.
Although there are a
bewildering variety of governance structures and divisions of power
between cities, towns, villages, school districts, counties, specialpurpose districts, and state governments, in no metropolitan area
are the collection of taxes and the provision of public amenities
equal across all the subareas that comprise it.55 Hence, in terms of
access to resources and public amenities such as quality public
schools, the increasing fragmentation of metropolitan areas since
1970 effectively undercuts progress in segregation at the
neighborhood level.
IV. Segregation, Children, and Access to Opportunity
Powerful research by Stanford economist Raj Chetty and his
colleagues demonstrates that the effects of living in segregated and
impoverished neighborhoods are particularly important for young
children.56 The longer-term benefits of reductions in segregation,
therefore, are tied to reducing segregation as it affects the
neighborhoods where children live and, in turn, the schools they
attend. Residential decisions are made by adults, but they are
affected by the presence and age of children.57 Those adults with
children are often motivated to seek safe neighborhoods and better
schools if they have the financial means to do so.58 To the extent

55. See generally NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994) (using data to
explore what motivated different income and racial groups to demand different kinds
of taxation, public services, and local government); see also KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 130–32
(1985).
56. See generally Chetty, Hendren & Katz, Effects of Exposure, supra note 34
(analyzing long-term data indicating that children who moved to low-poverty areas
experienced improved outcomes in areas such as college attendance and income as
an adult); see also Chetty et al., Land of Opportunity, supra note 34, at 1619–1620.
57. See generally W.A.V. Clark & Jun L. Onaka, Life Cycle and Housing
Adjustment as Explanations of Residential Mobility, 20 URB. STUD. 47 (1983)
(analyzing how trends in household lifestyle and composition impacts the decision to
move); PETER H. ROSSI, WHY FAMILIES MOVE: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 42, 70–80 (1955).
58. ANNETTE LAREAU & KIMBERLY GOYETTE, CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING
SCHOOLS: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND THE SEARCH FOR A GOOD SCHOOL 137–39
(2014).
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that some Whites have moved back to central cities in recent years,
they are likely to be childless, young adults, and empty nesters.59
These life-cycle considerations often lead to different levels of
segregation between White and Black children compared to White
and Black adults. Figure 5, below, shows the average level of
segregation of Black and White children enrolled in school by
education level.60 Segregation of children enrolled in school is
substantially higher than in the corresponding non-enrolled
populations. For example, the Index of Dissimilarity for Whites and
Blacks not attending primary or secondary school is 0.582, whereas
Black and White children enrolled in elementary school have an
Index of Dissimilarity of 0.717, 23% higher.61 White and Black high
school students are even more segregated, with a segregation score
of 0.738.62 The residential segregation of children enrolled in
kindergarten and pre-kindergarten is influenced both by the
segregation of families with children in that age range and by the
choices families make about enrolling those children, since these
schooling levels are not compulsory. Apparently, families exercise
their choices in ways that further increase segregation: children
enrolled in kindergarten and pre-kindergarten have the highest
Black/White segregation, measured at 0.798 (37% higher than those
not enrolled)—reminiscent of the peak segregation levels of 1970.63
To be clear, this extreme figure is not based on a few highly
segregated metropolitan areas, but rather, is the nationwide
average of all 384 metropolitan areas.64

59. See generally Ingrid Gould Ellen, Keren Mertens Horn & Katherine M.
O’Regan, Why Do Higher-Income Households Choose Low-Income Neighbourhoods?
Pioneering or Thrift?, 50 URB. STUD. 2478 (2013) (exploring why higher-income
households move into lower-income areas).
60. The figure and the analysis of this paragraph are based on the 2007–2011
American Community Survey and are adapted from Paul A. Jargowsky, Segregation,
Neighborhoods, and Schools, in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING SCHOOLS, supra note
58, at 97–136.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Figure 5. Black/White Segregation by School Enrollment

Because of the residential decisions of parents with children
and other life-cycle considerations, the declines in racial
segregation have left children behind.65 Declines in segregation
that skip over children are less likely to have beneficial effects on
social and economic outcomes. Ultimately, to evaluate how much
progress there has been against segregation, we must pay attention
to how and why segregation has negative effects. We must get
under the hood of the overall segregation levels and investigate who
remains segregated and how that is likely to affect racial inequality.
Conclusion
Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor are two highly acclaimed
economists, and rightly so.66 They have published prolifically on a
variety of topics, and their work is widely cited. However, I
respectfully disagree with their conclusion that the regime of racial
segregation of Blacks that began in the early twentieth century has
ended. Further, I argue that they have failed to show that the
“dream” that racial disparities in achievement and employment
could be ameliorated by reducing racial segregation “was a myth.”
However, my point in framing this discussion around Glaeser and
65. Similarly, the increases in economic segregation are driven largely by
families with children. The economic segregation of childless families has not
increased to any appreciable degree. Owens, supra note 43.
66. Edward Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at
Harvard University, and Jacob Vigdor is the Daniel J. Evans Professor of Public
Policy & Governance at the Evans School of Public Policy and Governance at the
University of Washington. GLAESER & VIGDOR, supra note 4.
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Vigdor’s article is not to attack them, since different scholars will
always weigh evidence in different ways. Rather, my point is to
argue that racial segregation and its consequences need to be
understood in terms of a broader set of factors that, operating
together, limit spatial access to opportunity.
To borrow a concept from economics, Glaeser and Vigdor did a
comparative statics analysis of segregation. That is, they looked at
the changes in racial segregation as if other things were being held
constant, and noted that though segregation declined, there had
been “only limited progress” in improving the educational and labor
market equilibria.67 Beyond the problem of overstating the decline
in segregation due to their measurement strategy, they did not take
into account the interaction of racial segregation with growing
economic segregation, itself driven in part by White flight to the
suburbs to escape attempts to desegregate schools and housing in
the central cities. They also failed to appreciate the way in which
the impact of racial segregation is magnified by growing income
inequality and the changing spatial structure of metropolitan areas.
Further, by not thinking critically about the mechanisms through
which racial segregation’s harms propagate, they did not
investigate the extent to which children, and therefore schools,
remain segregated at levels more common in the 1970s, the height
of the segregated century.
To borrow a concept from legal analysis, I argue that the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that racial segregation
is still with us and continues to hold back Blacks, particularly those
living in racially and economically isolated neighborhoods. We do
not yet have reason or evidence to reject the view that integration
could help to achieve a more equal society because segregation still
dominates the demographic organization of our nation’s
metropolitan areas. We will not be in a position to empirically
evaluate the potential of reducing segregation until we achieve
substantial racial integration, particularly if it can be achieved
without offsetting effects due to increasing inequality, economic
segregation, and metropolitan fragmentation.

67. See id. at 10.

